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A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF STUDENT
RESIDENCY LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
[T]he right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is
of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that
right strike at the heart of representative government.'
The right to vote is virtually the sine qua non of a free society and
has been labeled a "fundamental right" by the United States Supreme
Court.2 Therefore, in order to obtain a fully operative democracy, one
which provides the ballot as the means by which all citizens may express
their political views, it is imperative that this franchise be extended equally
to all citizens. There is, however, a noticeable gap in the application of
this mandate in the case of the "out-of-town" student voter, i.e., the student
who moves into a new election district to attend an institution of higher
learning.3
Since the passage of the twenty-sixth amendment, 4 which lowered the
voting age in all elections to eighteen, it is estimated that the electorate
has been increased by approximately 5 million voters who are presently
obtaining a post-high school education. 5 Of these, approximately 2 million
are living outside their parental election districts.6
These students are confronted with a serious dilemma when they
attempt to exercise their franchise. First, the local government of the
college town will necessarily have a more proximate impact on the students'
daily activities than the parental town, and consequently the students will
1. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
2. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
3. For the purposes of this Comment, the word "student" shall mean an in-
dividual who, while attending an institution of higher learning, is living in an election
district other than that from which he moved to enter the institution.
It is recognized that the problem of dual residence extends to many groups
other than students, such as those who maintain homes in more than one area, those
who work in one voting district and live in another, or those who constantly shift
between various districts in pursuit of seasonal work. However, this Comment focuses
only upon the student group.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI provides:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of
age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of age.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation.
5. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS (1970).
6. COMMITTEE ON ELECTION LAW REFORM OF THE YOUNG LAWYERS SECTION OF
THE ABA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON STUDENT VOTING RESIDENCE 7 (Prelim.
Unofficial Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. The estimate was compiled
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have a strong desire to vote in the college election district. When they
attempt to register in the college town, however, they will be confronted
with a student residency law creating a presumption against their bona
fide residency 7 and providing no standards for the determination of such
residency by the local registrar or courts."
Secondly, if they cannot establish residency in the new district, they
must vote in their parental district even though their interest as voters in
that district is significantly diminished. Moreover, if it is impossible for
a student to vote in person in his parental district, he must resort to
absentee voting provisions which can often prove to be a very unsatisfactory
substitute. For example, six states currently restrict absentee voting to
particular elections, 9 and one has no student absentee voting provision at
all. 10 Among the states allowing absentee voting, 24 do not permit regis-
tration by mail," thereby requiring the student to travel to his parental
district in order to register. Thus, the combined operation of these pro-
visions effectively denies some students the opportunity to vote in both
their college and parental districts.
Liberalization of the absentee voting provisions will allow the student
to vote in his parental district and thus permit him to exercise his right
at least to that extent. However, this is hardly a desirable solution. As
noted above, the student is not concerned with the activities of the local
government in his parental district, if for no other reason than geographic
alienation. He desires, and rightfully so, a voice in the governmental
unit having the most direct affect upon him, i.e., the college town. There-
fore, if the student vote is to be meaningfully exercised, facilitation of
student registration in the college communities must be forthcoming. It
will, therefore, be the purpose of this Comment to describe the current
barriers to student voting in college communities - the special statutory
residency provisions for students, the judicial presumptions that have
arisen through interpretation of these statutes, and the lack of standards
in those provisions for the determination of residency - and then to
present a constitutional framework for their dissolution.
7. See note 33 and accompanying text infra.
8. See note 51 infra.
9. See YOUTH CITIZENSHIP FUND, INC., THE YOUNG VOTERS GUIDE TO VOTING
RIGHTS AND RESIDENCY (1971) [hereinafter cited as YOUNG VOTERS]. In Delaware,
there are absentee voting provisions only for general elections; in Maryland, with
the exception of Baltimore, there are no absentee provisions pertaining to municipal
elections; Massachusetts does not provide any absentee provisions for its primaries;
New Hampshire only provides an absentee ballot for the biennial general election;
New Mexico makes absolutely no provision with regard to municipal elections; and
North Carolina makes no provisions for student voting in local primaries. Id. at 27-28.
10. There is no absentee voting provision pertaining to students in Mississippi.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 3196.01 (1956).
11. The following states will not permit a student to register to vote through
the mails: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois
(pertaining to only part of the state), Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. See
YOUNG VOTERS, supra note 9, at 12-13.
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II. RESIDENCY STATUTES AND THE QUESTION OF
BONA FIDE RESIDENCY
Article I, section 2,12 and the seventeenth amendment 13 of the Constitu-
tion have traditionally been interpreted as vesting the states with the sole
power to establish voter qualifications.' 4 While the states are granted
wide latitude in establishing voter qualifications, any standard adopted must
meet the mandates of the Constitution. 15 In Carrington v. Rash,16 the
Supreme Court held that a state had the power to impose reasonable
residency requirements.1 7 Such residency requirements are generally pro-
vided for in state statutes or constitutions and usually require an individual
be a "resident" of the state, county, and voting district for a specified
period of time prior to the election. 18 The state interests advanced in
support of such residency requirements are the accurate identification of
voters to prevent fraud 19 and the maintenance of a locally interested and
informed electorate. 20
12. This section provides:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second
Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall
have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of
the State Legislature.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added).
13. The amendment provides in part:
[1] The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall
have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite
for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
14. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965). See Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), wherein the Court stated:
While the right of suffrage is established and guaranteed by the Constitution ...
it is subject to the imposition of state standards which are not discriminatory
and which do not contravene any restriction that Congress, acting pursuant to its
constitutional powers, has imposed.
Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
15. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
16. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
17. Id. at 91.
18. For example, the Tennessee Constitution and the Tennessee statutes provide
in pertinent part:
Right to vote - Election precincts - Every person of the age of twenty-one
years, being a citizen of the United States, and a resident of this State for twelve
months, and of the county wherein such person may offer to vote for three
months, next preceding the day of election, shall be entitled to vote for electors
for President and Vice-President of the United States, members of the General
Assembly and other civil officers for the county or district in which such person
resides; and there shall be no other qualification attached to the right of suffrage.
TENN. CONST. art. 4, § 1.
Qualifications of voters - Every person of the age of twenty-one (21) years,
being a citizen of the United States and a resident of this state for twelve (12)
months, and of the county wherein he may offer his vote for three (3) months
next preceding the day of election, shall be entitled to vote for members of the
general assembly and other civil officers for the county or district in which he
may reside.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-201 (1932).
19. Howard v. Skinner, 87 Md. 556, 558, 40 A. 379, 381 (1898).




Silk: A Constitutional Analysis of Student Residency Laws
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The term "resident" as used in the many suffrage statutes has been
subject to various interpretations by the courts. In some cases bona fide
residence has been construed to require habitual presence and intention
to return after any departure.2 1 Other courts have required an affirmative
intention to remain permanently or indefinitely at the place where one
lives ,22 or that there be no present intention of leaving. 23 The majority of
courts, however, agree that regardless of how bona fide residency is
defined, there is no absolute criterion with which a person's actual residence
can be determined, 24 and thus, it remains a question of fact that must be
resolved on a case-by-case basis.
Although one's physical presence is an essential fact in establishing a
bona fide residence, 25 the courts seem to agree that the actual physical
presence of an individual is not, in and of itself, determinative in establishing
bona fide residence. Rather, it is the individual's intent which is critical.26
Therefore, regardless of the definition utilized by the court, the intent of
the individual is always ultimately at issue. In investigating this question,
the courts have looked to various factors. For example, some courts have
held that the individual's intent must be satisfactorily demonstrated by his
conduct or prior statements. 27 These courts generally maintain that the
individual's oath as to his actual intent will not constitute conclusive proof
thereof, 28 although such a statement can constitute an extremely important
factor. However, if a discrepancy exists between one's declarations and
his conduct, most courts state that one's conduct will be determinative.
Therefore, declarations of intent become important only where one's conduct
is neutral. 29
III. TRE SPECIAL RULES ON STUDENT
BONA FIDE RESIDENCY
When a student seeks to establish bona fide residency, the issue
assumes a different posture. Under the general rules of residency, one's
21. Littell v. Millemon, 154 Kan. 669, 674, 121 P.2d 233, 237 (1942).
22. Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. 302, 309 (1872).
23. In re Erickson, 18 N.J. Misc. 5, 12, 10 A.2d 142, 146 (Cir. Ct. 1939).
24. Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 31 A. 300 (1895) ; Warren v. Board of
Registration, 72 Mich. 398, 40 N.W. 553 (1888); Lankford v. Gebhart, 130 Mo. 621,32 S.W. 1127 (1895) ; Nelson v. Gass, 27 N.D. 357, 146 N.W. 537 (1914) ; Stevens
v. Union Graded School Dist., 136 Okla. 10, 275 P. 1056 (1929).
25. People v. Turpin, 49 Colo. 234, 112 P. 539 (1910) ; State v. Savre, 129 Iowa
122, 105 N.W. 387 (1905).
26. Ptak v. Jameson, 215 Ark. 292, 298-99, 220 S.W.2d 592, 595-96 (1946)
Parsons v. People, 30 Colo. 388, 392, 70 P. 689, 690-91 (1902) ; Kegley v. Johnson,
207 Va. 54, 147 S.E.2d 735 (1966). In all three cases, the courts required a current
intent to remain in the area for an indefinite time and not merely to attend college.
27. Pedigo v. Grimes, 113 Ind. 148, 153, 13 N.E. 700, 703 (1887) ; Brownlee v.
Duquid, 93 Ind. App. 266, 270, 178 N.E. 174, 175 (1931).
28. In re Blankford, 241 N.Y. 180, 183, 149 N.E. 415, 416 (1925) ; Seibold v.
Wahl, 164 Wis. 82, 83, 159 N.W. 546, 547 (1916).
29. State v. Scott, 171 Ind. 349, 86 N.E. 409 (1908) ; Pedigo v. Grimes, 113 Ind.
148, 13 N.E. 700 (1887).
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physical presence, although insufficient to establish bona fide residency in
and of itself,30 is generally deemed to be an important factor.3 1 However,
when student residency is at issue, physical presence is not an important
factor; in fact, it is often of no effect whatsoever. The reason is simply
that most statutes pertaining to student voters specifically provide that,
for the purposes of voting, no one shall gain or lose his residency by virtue
of his status as a student at an institution of higher learning.32 Provisions
of this nature have been interpreted by most courts as creating a rebuttable
presumption that the student came to the area without the intent necessary
to establish bona fide residency.33 The student must overcome this pre-
sumption to prove residency.3 4 In attempting to rebut this presumption,
the student's intent will be the controlling factor, 5 and it is evident that
if the student intends to return to his parental home upon completion
of his education, he will not be deemed to have the stat, of mind necessary
to acquire a voting residence in his college community.36 This result
occurs even though the student may be emancipated from his parentsY
However, where the student can demonstrate the requisite intent, as defined
30. See note 26 and accompanying text supra. In Anderson v. Pifer, 315 Ill. 164,
146 N.E. 171 (1924), the court observed that, although the college student's residency
is a question of fact, the mere physical presence of the student, without more, is
insufficient to establish residency. Also in Welch v. Shumway, 232 Ill. 54, 83 N.E. 549
(1908), the court refused to allow a student to vote, even though the student remained
in the college town the sufficient length of time under the durational statute. The
Welch court held that bona fide residence must be established by evidence other
than one's mere physical presence in the community. The court in Frakes v. Farragut
Community School Dist., 255 Iowa 88, 121 N.W.2d 636 (1963), concluded that a
student's presence in the college community for the purpose of an education did not
cause him to lose residence in his prior community nor gain residence in the college
community. See Shaeffer v. Gilbert, 73 Md. 66, 20 A. 434 (1890) ; Goben v. Murrell,
195 Mo. App. 104, 190 S.W. 986 (1916) ; Brueckmann v. Frignoca, 9 N.J. Misc. 128,
152 A. 780 (Cir. Ct. 1930) ; In re Barry, 164 N.Y. 18, 58 N.E. 12 (1900).
31. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
32. See, e.g., PA. STAT. tit. 25, § 2813 (1937). For a list of other jurisdictions,
together with a summary of the legislation found in each, see Singer, Student Power
at the Polls, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, app. (1970).
33. Attorney Gen. ex rel. Miller v. Miller, 266 Mich. 127, 253 N.W. 241 (1934)
People v. Osborne, 170 Mich. 143, 135 N.W. 921 (1912) ; Wolcott v. Holcomb, 97
Mich. 361, 56 N.W. 837 (1893).
34. Welch v. Shumway, 232 Il. 54, 83 N.E. 549, 562-63 (1908); Sanders v.
Getchell, 76 Me. 158, 165 (1884); Shaeffer v. Gilbert, 73 Md. 66, 72, 20 A. 434,
435 (1890).
35. The court in Anderson v. Pifer, 315 Ill. 164, 146 N.E. 171 (1924), observed
that a college student who had no home other than his college residence could be
enfranchised since this freedom from parental support and control established the
requisite intention required by the state residency statute. The court stated that a
student who did not possess this independence could not establish residency. Id. at
165, 146 N.E. at 173. See Holmes v. Pino, 131 La. 687, 60 So. 78 (1912) ; Sanders v.
Getchell, 76 Me. 158 (1884); Pittman v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488 (1813); Swan v.
Bowker, 135 Neb. 405, 281 N.W. 891 (1938) ; Seibold v. Wahl, 164 Wis. 82, 159
N.W. 546 (1916).
36. The court in Anderson v. Pifer, 315 Ill. 164, 146 N.E. 171 (1924), denied a
voting residence to a group of college students because of their intent to return to their
parental home or to locate elsewhere to find employment. Id. at 165, 146 N.E. at 173.
37. Fry's Election Case,'71 Pa. 302 (1872).
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in the particular state,38 he will successfully rebut the presumption and
attain residency. 39
Obviously then, the most difficult problem confronting a substantial
number of students is their understandable indecision as to whether they
will remain in the college community, move to another area, or return
to their parental homes upon graduation. When faced with the student
who is undecided as to his future plans, several courts have taken a
liberal view and allowed the student to register, 40 while others have taken
a considerably stricter approach and have denied registration in the college
community.41
Since intent is normally demonstrated and verified through conduct,
it seems appropriate, as a matter of fairness, that the courts or legislature
standardize the factors which are to be considered by registrars in deter-
mining student residency. Unfortunately, the legislatures have been silent
and the courts have been less than clear on this issue. Some of the factors
cited by courts have been: parental control over the student ;42 the
student's financial independence from his parents ;43 the student's marital
status ;44 the maintenance of local savings and checking accounts ;45 local
auto registration or the acquisition of a local driver's license ;46 ownership
of local property ;47 payment of local and state income taxes ;48 and employ-
38. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
39. Ptak v. Jameson, 215 Ark. 292, 220 S.W.2d 592 (1949); Holmes v. Pino,
131 La. 687, 60 So. 78 (1912) ; Shaeffer v. Gilbert, 73 Md. 66, 20 A. 434 (1890)
Robbins v. Chamberlain, 297 N.Y. 108, 75 N.E.2d 617 (1947).
40. Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488 (1813) ; Berry v. Wilcox, 44 Neb. 82, 62
N.W. 249 (1895) ; Asbahr v. Wahl, 164 Wis. 89, 159 N.W. 549 (1916).
41. In Vanderpoel v. O'Hanlon, 53 Iowa 246, 5 N.W. 487 (1880), the court
held that a student who attended a university, not knowing whether he intended to
make the university town his home or to return to his former home after he com-
pleted his education, would not be permitted to vote in the university town. Id. at
248, 5 N.W. at 489. See Opinion of the Justices, 46 Mass. 587 (1843) ; In re Hoffman,
187 Misc. 799, 65 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
42. Welch v. Shunway, 232 Ill. 54, 88, 83 N.E. 549, 562-63 (1908) ; Sanders v.
Getchell, 76 Me. 158, 166 (1884) ; Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488, 499-500 (1813) ;
Hall v. Schoenecke, 128 Mo. 661, 666, 31 S.W. 97, 98 (1895) ; Seibold v. Wahl, 164
Wis. 82, 86, 159 N.W. 546, 548 (1916).
43. Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488, 500 (1813).
44. Robbins v. Chamberlain, 297 N.Y. 108, 112, 75 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1947).
45. In Frakes v. Farragut Community School Dist., 255 Iowa 88, 121 N.W.2d 636
(1963), the court recognized that the maintenance of a bank account in the school
community will constitute evidence of the student's intention to establish a residence
in that community. Id. at 90, 121 N.W.2d at 638. In Goldhaber v. Onondaga County
Bd. of Elections, 31 App. Div. 2d 891, 299 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1967), the court held that
the student's local savings and checking accounts, along with the purchase of mutual
funds and insurance from local brokers, was indicative of an intent to make the school
community his home.
46. Goldhaber v. Onondaga County Bd. of Elections, 31 App. Div. 2d 891, 299
N.Y.S.2d 814 (1967).
47. In Opinion of the Justices, 46 Mass. 587 (1843), the court stated that the
student's ownership of real property in his prior community should be considered
circumstantial evidence that he had not changed his voting residence to the college
community. In Michaud v. Yeomans, 115 N.J. Super. 200, 278 A.2d 537 (1971), the
court regarded the student's lack of storage of his clothing at his school abode as
indicative of the student's intent not to make his school community his voting resi-
dence. The court in Palla v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 38 App. Div. 2d 84,
327 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1971), recognized the applicability of the New York "gain or
[VOL. 18
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ment in the local community.4 9 Given the wide variety of factors that
are considered5 ° and the lack of judicial and legislative guidance not only
as to which factors must be considered, but also to the weight to be
afforded any given factor,51 it is apparent that the resulting uncontrolled
discretion wielded by the local registrar presents a serious barrier to
student voting.5 2 It is submitted that such residency laws - creating a
presumption against bona fide residence and containing no intelligible
standards - are of doubtful constitutional validity.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF STUDENT
RESIDENCY LAWS
The presumption against bona fide student residency would appear
to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
especially if the analysis of the Supreme Court in the recent case of Dunn
v. Blumstein53 is applied. In addition, since no standards for determining
intent have been established, the laws would also appear violative of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Following is an analysis
of such propositions.
A. The Presumption Against Bona Fide Residency
1. The Dunn Decision-
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dunn v. Blumstein,54 every
state had a durational residency requirement ranging from two years"5
to ninety days,56 with the usual length being one year. 7  In addition, a
split existed in the lower federal courts in regard to the constitutionality
of these durational residency requirements.5 8
loss" statute which permits the various election boards to consider the student's
property in determining his application for voting residency.
48. Frakes v. Farragut Community School Dist., 255 Iowa 88, 92-93, 121 N.W.2d
636, 638 (1963) ; Sanders v. Getchell, 76 Me. 158, 167 (1884).
49. In re Goldhaber, 55 Misc. 2d 111, 112, 285 N.Y.S.2d 747, 748 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
50. Several opinions have emphasized that the factors which may be enumerated
are not, in fact, exclusive. Welch v. Shumway, 232 Ill. 54, 77-79, 83 N.E. 549, 559
(1908) ; Pedigo v. Grimes, 113 Ind. 148, 153, 13 N.E. 700, 702 (1887) ; Sanders v.
Getchell, 76 Me. 158, 165 (1884). Thus it would be fair to conclude that there is no
limit on the number of factors a registrar may consider and the weight the registrar
may place on any single factor.
51. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 24. The report stated that election boards had
no written standards setting forth the criteria to be used or the weight to be given
such criteria. In addition, there was no system designed to elicit the correct informa-
tion as to the questions being asked by the registrar.
52. Id. at 22.
53. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
54. Id. For a pre-Dunn analysis, see Guido, Student Voting and ResidencyQualifications: The Aftermath of the Twenty-sixth Amendment, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 32
(1972).
55. Miss. CODE ANN. § 3235 (1942).
56. PA. STAT. tit. 25, § 2811 (1971).
57. See MacLeod & Wilberding, State Voting Residency Requirements and Civil
Rights, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 93, 96-97 (1969).
58, Durational residency requirements were held unconstitutional in Andrews v.
Cody, 327 F. Supp. 793 (M.D.N.C. 1971) ; Keppel v. Donovan, 326 F. Supp. 15 (D.
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In Dunn, the durational residency law of Tennessee was challenged as
violative of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. 59 That
law required a voter to be a resident of the state for one year and a
resident of the county for three months prior to the election date.60 Since
the Court found the durational residency requirement to affect two funda-
mental rights - the right to vote and the right to travel6l - they applied
the "compelling state interest" equal protection test.62
Under this "compelling state interest" test, which is the stricter equal
protection test, 3 the requirement is unconstitutional unless the state can
demonstrate that the laws are necessary to promote a compelling govern-
mental interest.6 4 "[A] heavy burden of justification is on the state, and
that statute will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purpose. " 65
In addition, the state cannot choose a means of achieving its interest
which has the effect of unnecessarily burdening or restricting a constitu-
tionally protected activity.66 If other reasonable alternatives are available,
the state must employ these less burdensome methods.6 7 Moreover, even
if the least drastic alternative is used, the state's interest must be compelling
when balanced against the constitutional interests infringed by the statute.66
In beginning its analysis of the Tennessee law, the Court noted that,
in Oregon v. Mitchell,6" a specific finding was made that durational
residency requirements and more restrictive registration practices do not
bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling state interest in the conduct
of presidential elections. 70 However, since the Tennessee law applied to
congressional, state, and local elections, conceivably the state could establish
a compelling state interest. Therefore, the Court examined the alleged
state interests promoted by the durational residency requirements:
Minn. 1970); Kohn v. Davis, 320 F. Supp. 246 (D. Vt. 1970); Hadnott v. Amos,
320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970) ; Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Va.
1970) ; Lester v. Board of Elections, 319 F. Supp. 505 (D.D.C. 1970) ; Affeldt v.
Whitcomb, 319 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380
(D. Mass. 1970). Such requirements were upheld in Fontham v. McKeithen, 336
F. Supp. 153 (E.D. La. 1971) ; Ferguson v. Williams, 330 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Miss.
1971) ; Philiavin v. Hoel, 320 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Wis. 1970) ; Howe v. Brown, 319
F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 402 (D.
Ariz. 1970).
59. 405 U.S. at 335.
60. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-201 (1932).
61. 405 U.S. at 338-39 & n.8.
62. Id. at 338-39.
63. Id. at 337 n.6.
64. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) ; Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
65. 405 U.S. at 343.
66. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967) ; NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963).
67. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
68. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 n.14 (1969). The
burden of establishing the existence of this interest is upon the state. Id. at 627-28.
69. 400 U.S. 112 (1971). In Oregon, the Supreme Court upheld section 202 of
the 1970 Federal Voting Rights Act. In that Act Congress abolished all state dura-
tional residency requirements for presidential elections and prohibited the closing of
registration more than 30 days before such elections. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1 (a) (6)
(1970).
70. 405 U.S. at 344.
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(1) INSURE PURITY OF BALLOT BOX - Protection against
fraud through colonization and inability to identify persons offering
to vote, and
(2) KNOWLEDGEABLE VOTERS - Afford some surety that the
voter has, in fact, become a member of the community and that
as such, he has a common interest in all matters pertaining to its
government and is, therefore, more likely to exercise his right
more intelligently. 7'
In considering the first purpose for the requirements, the Court held
that although "the prevention of such fraud is a legitimate and compelling
government goal . . . it is impossible to view durational residence re-
quirements as necessary to achieve that State's interest."7 2 The Court
reasoned that the durational residency requirement was not necessary to
identify bona fide residents since the voter registration system adequately
served this purpose. 73 Moreover, it was noted that while the law was
designed to prevent only nonresidents from voting, it, in effect, deprived
newly arrived residents, as well as nonresidents, of the franchise. 74 The
Court then concluded "that 30 days appears to be an ample period of time
for the State to complete whatever administrative tasks are necessary to
prevent fraud - and a year or three months, too much."', However, it
is probably not valid to assume from this statement that the Court has
set up an absolute thirty-day maximum, for Justice Blackmun stated in
his concurring opinion:
I am content that the one year and three month requirements be
struck down for want of something more closely related to the State's
interest. It is, of course, a matter of line-drawing, as the Court
concedes . . . . But if 30 days pass constitutional muster, what of 35
or 45 or 75 ? The resolution of these longer measures, less than those
today struck down, the Court leaves. I suspect, to the future.76
Since the Court discussed the constitutionality of the three-month
county requirement together with the one-year state requirement - imply-
ing that the same problems face both the state and the county, it appears
71. Id. at 345.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 354. The Court noted that since the resident's qualifications, including
bona fide residency, are established by oath, the durational residency requirement
becomes an obstacle to those residents who truthfully state their actual situation. The
state was trying to prevent fraudulent voting, but the fraudulent voter would cer-
tainly swear that he had fulfilled the various requirements. The Court found no
evidence that the state routinely went behind the voter's qualifications, and thus con-
cluded that the burdensome qualifications really failed to deter such fraudulent con-
duct. The Court could not reconcile the fact that the state permitted registration up
to thirty days before a state election, nor the fact that it had only a three-month
requirement for county elections, with the one-year requirement for the state. From
these lower requirements, the Court inferred that the state could sufficiently investi-
gate the sworn claims within those periods and that the longer requirement was, there-
fore, unnecessary. Id. at 346-49.
74. Id. at 354.
75. Id. at 348.
76. Id. at 363 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
COMMENTS
9
Silk: A Constitutional Analysis of Student Residency Laws
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
that a maximum durational residency requirement must be less than the
three-month period and that a thirty-day requirement will be upheld. This
holding, in effect, declared unconstitutional every state's durational residency
law for congressional and state elections.77
In arriving at its estimation of the time period actually necessary
to prevent fraud, the Dunn Court was confronted with the state's argument
that longer durational periods assure the bona fide residency of the voter
since they create an administratively useful, conclusive presumption that
recent arrivals to the state are not, in fact, bona fide residents. The state
argued that this presumption inhibits fraud since political candidates are
discouraged from inducing migration for voting purposes.7 8 The Court
rejected this argument,7 9 citing Carrington v. Rash,80 which held that
states "may not casually deprive a class of individuals of the vote because
of some remote administrative benefit to the State."8' The Carrington
Court held such "conclusive presumptions" violative of equal protection
because they excluded many eligible voters while more precise tests were
available to determine residency.82 The Dunn Court, therefore, concluded
that the other devices available to Tennessee for calculating bona fide
residency should be employed:
[Since] it is unlikely that would-be fraudulent voters would remain
in a false locale for the lengthy period imposed by durational residence
requirements, it is just as unlikely that they would collect such objective
indicia of bona fide residence as a dwelling, car registration, or drivers
license. 8
3
Finally, the Court concluded that the various available criminal sanctions
were a more effective measure for the deterrence of fraudulent voting.8 4
Having decided that the prevention of fraud was not a sufficiently
compelling interest to justify retention of Tennessee's durational residency
requirements, the Court analyzed the state's argument that the durational
requirement fostered the state's interest in assuring a knowledgeable elect-
orate. The state initially claimed that the requirements "afford some surety
that the voter has, in fact, become a member of the community." 85 The
Court found no merit in this argument since the durational period did
not begin to run until the individual had become a bona fide resident,
which admittedly required a finding that he was a member of the com-
77. See MacLeod & Wilberding, supra note 57.
78. 405 U.S. at 349-50.
79. Id. at 350-51.
80. 380 U.S. 89 (1965). In Carrington, the Court was faced with a situation in
which the State of Texas having difficulty determining whether persons moving into
the state while serving in the military were bona fide residents and facing difficult
administrative determinations of factual issues, had established a conclusive pre-
sumption which excluded from voting all military personnel moving to Texas who
had not been prior residents.
81. Id. at 96.
82. Id. at 95-96.
83. 405 U.S. at 352.
84. Id. at 353-54 & n.25.
85. Id. at 354.
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munity. Therefore, through the durational requirement, the state was not
merely insisting that the individual be a member of the community, but
also that he be a "longtime," as opposed to a "recent," bona fide resident.86
The state also maintained that the durational requirement assured that
the voter possessed a common interest in all matters pertaining to the
community's government.8 7  The Court noted that a similar claim had
been refuted in Carrington:
But if they are in fact residents . . . they, as all other qualified resi-
dents, have a right to an equal opportunity for political representation.
• . . "Fencing out" from the franchise a sector of the population
because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.88
Finally, the state argued that a longtime resident was likely to cast
a more informed vote than a recent resident.89 The Court rejected this
argument, stating that it had previously held unconstitutional exclusions
based on this rationale. 90
Finding neither state interest sufficiently compelling to sustain the
abridgement of the constituional rights to vote and to travel, the Court
voided the Tennessee durational requirement as violative of the fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause.9'
2. Application of the Dunn Rationale to the Presumption
Against Student Bona Fide Residency
Although the Supreme Court in Dunn was very careful to decide only
the specific issue of the constitutionality of durational residency require-
ments, 92 it is logical to conclude that the case identified the path that must
be taken when the constitutionality of the student presumption against
bona fide residency laws is challenged. This is true because the challenge
will develop around the equal protection clause, and the states will argue
that they have a compelling reason for placing restrictions on student
voters. The states will probably introduce the same interests sought to
be protected in Dunn - fraud and knowledgeable voters - and the Court
will have to examine these interests by using the same reasoning employed
in Dunn since the Court will be examining the same fundamental right
the right to vote.
It should be noted that the Court has previously acknowledged that
the states have the power to require that their voters maintain a bona fide
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 380 U.S. at 94.
89. 405 U.S. at 356.
90. Id. at 356-60. The Court noted that this argument had been rejected in
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970) ; Ciprano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706
(1969) ; and Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
91. 405 U.S. at 361.
92. The Court stated that the "appellee does not challenge Tennessee's power to
restrict the vote to bona fide Tennessee residents." Id. at 342.
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residency in the relevant political subdivision of the state.93 In fact, the
Dunn Court stated in dicta that:
An appropriately defined and uniformly applied requirement of bona
fide residence may be necessary to preserve the basic conception of a
political community, and therefore could withstand close constitutional
scrutiny.04
It is therefore conceded, for the purposes of this Comment, that the state
may require bona fide residency as a condition precedent to registration.
Nevertheless, it is advanced that the special student presumption against
bona fide residency is discriminatory and falls short of the "appropriately
defined and uniformly applied requirement" referred to in Dunn.95
Following the Dunn rationale, therefore, the constitutional framework
for the dissolution of this student presumption is clearly the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. Upon attack, it is certain that a
court will apply the "compelling interest" test, rather than the "rational
basis" test, since a fundamental right is affected by the classification, i.e.,
the right to vote. As the Court stated in Dunn:
[I]f a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizeng
and denies the franchise to others, "the Court must determine whether
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest."9 6
The state's first argument in support of the constitutionality of its
statute will undoubtedly be that it insures the purity of the ballot box by
protecting against fraudulent voting through student colonization.97 Fraud-
ulent voting through colonization is the practice whereby nonresidents
temporarily invade a state and, through false swearing, register to vote
for the sole purpose of electing a particular candidate. 9
Before reaching the question of whether this state interest is com-
pelling or whether there are reasonable alternatives, it appears that the
state would have to establish that the student poses a greater threat to
the state in controlling fraudulent and double voting than other groups
to justify the special classification for students. A strong argument can
be made that migration within our nation is substantial among all groups,99
and thus, there is no legal reason for the heavier restrictions on students. 1°°
93. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 421-22 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969) ; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965)
Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1904).
94. 405 U.S. at 343-44 (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 337 (emphasis supplied by the Court), quoting Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
97. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
98. 405 U.S. at 345.
99. According to the 1960 census, the largest groups of transients were operative
and kindred workers, with craftsmen and foremen second, and professionals, includ-
ing students, third. Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the
Tensions of a Mobile Society, 61 Mica. L. REV. 823, 830 n.10 (1963).
100. It is unreasonable for a state to place a higher burden on students when the
mere presence in a community for other classes of individuals, who are almost certain
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In any event, unless the state can establish by valid empirical data that
the students, in fact, pose a special threat to the state, the distinctive
treatment of students must be considered an arbitrary and hence un-
constitutional classification. Moreover, the state's alleged interest in the
presumption against students, to prevent a student from crossing the state
line for the sole purpose of voting or from voting in more than one
political subdivision, may be satisfied by less inhibitive methods. 10 1
It has been suggested that to prevent dual voting, state voting officials
simply have to cross-check lists of new registrants with their former juris-
dictions.1 0 2 This approach would be more effective in controlling the prac-
tice since, under many existing systems, the local registrar relies exclusively
upon the information received from the student upon registration.1 0 3 More-
over, with the aid of modern communications, it is administratively feasible
for the state to check a voter's identification through the use of social
security numbers, drivers licenses, or photographs. Perhaps, a nationwide
voter identification service could be established which would process each
voter and allow him to register in only one political subdivision at a time,
with forefeiture of voting rights in that subdivision upon the adoption
of another.
A criminal law prohibiting fraudulent or double voting is another viable
solution. In fact, the Supreme Court in Dunn stated:
Tennessee has at its disposal a variety of criminal laws which are
more than adequate to detect and deter whatever fraud may be feared.'0 4
In sum, although the student residence provisions may serve legitimate
state interests in preventing fraudulent and double voting, it is evident
that unless the state can show that these less restrictive alternatives are
administratively unfeasible, the Supreme Court will probably not consider
student residency statutes necessary to the achievements of the state goals.105
The second argument the state will undoubtedly assert in support of
its law is that the student bona fide residency statute furthers the legitimate
state interest in maintaining "knowledgeable voters." Such a status is
purportedly achieved when the voter becomes a member of the community
and, as such, acquires a common interest with other residents with respect
to move at some future time, is regarded as positive evidence of the latter's intention
to become residents for voting purposes. Pedigo v. Grimes, 113 Ind. 148, 13 N.E. 700(1887) ; In re Lower Merion Election, 1 CHESTER REP. 257 (Pa. 1880).
101. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court struck down the
residency requirement of a welfare statute which the state had argued was a safe-
guard against fraud, but the Court concluded that fraud could be minimized through
the use of less drastic means which were available to the state. Id. at 637.
102. 405 U.S. at 348, citing 37 U. Cnii. L. REV. 359, 364 & n.34 (1970).
103. 405 U.S. at 346.
104. Id. at 353.
105. In Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971), the court
held that, in view of the other safeguards available to insure the purity of the election
process, the student residency statute was unnecessary to prevent fraud.
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to local governmental matters. This, in turn, theoretically produces a voter
who will exercise the franchise more intelligently'0 6 since a local election
directly affects his interests. 0 T
In Evans v. Cornnan,1 0 8 the state presented a similar argument for
denying residency to members of the National Institute of Health, a federal
enclave. In that case, the members of the enclave were exempt from certain
laws which applied to other residents;09 therefore, the state argued that
they lacked a sufficient attachment to the community to be considered
members thereof and hence were not bona fide residents. The Evans Court
held this denial of the right to vote violative of equal protection, notwith-
standing the different rights and obligations of the individuals within
the enclave. 10
By comparison, students would seem to have a more direct attachment
to the community than the residents in Evans. As the Michigan Supreme
Court stated:
[W]e see that students have just as many connections with the com-
munity as those found by the Supreme Court in Evans and Kolodzie-
jski. Students . . . are included in the census determination of the
state's congressional apportionment ... [and] are subject to the state's
laws and regulations. Jury lists are chosen from lists of registered
voters. Thus, by denying students the right to register and vote, they
are also denied . . . trial by a jury of their peers. Students pay state
income tax, city income tax (if any), gasoline, sales and use taxes ....
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, property taxes
are ultimately paid by renters such as some of the appellants ....
Students with children can and do enroll them in the public school
system, and, therefore, have more than a passing interest in the
educational standards of the community.' 1'
106. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
107. Singer, supra note 32, at 706-07.
108. 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
109. Id. at 425 n.5. They were exempt from real estate, severance, and personal
property taxes, state regulatory and licensing legislation, state militia service, com-
pulsory education laws, and state court jurisdiction for criminal offenses committed
on the enclave's grounds.
110. Id. at 426.
111. Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 688-90, 189 N.W.2d 423, 431-32 (1971)
(footnotes omitted). There seems to be a definite conflict between the United States
census, which includes students as residents of their college communities, and the
state residency laws which do not. This problem is dramatized by the fact that
"forty-three states included for census purposes all students residing within the state
and correspondingly excluded any student who had left the state to attend college
elsewhere." Note, Student Voting and Apportionment: The "Rotten Boroughs" of
Academia, 81 YALE L.J. 35, 46 (1971). Further, at least 43 states base their appor-
tionment formulae on population figures. Silva, One Man, One Vote and the Popula-
tion Base, in REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION 57-58 (R. Goldwin ed. 1966),
citing COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE Boox OF THE STATES: 1964-65, at 62-63(1964). Thus students are part of the apportionment formulae but not part of the
voting population. A similar situation was noted by the Supreme Court in Evans v.
Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 421 (1970), to be an argument favoring the registration of
federal workers, who experience a similar voting problem. Such apportionment
formulae also seem to be contrary to the holding in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533(1964), where the Court stated that each vote should have an equal effect, and that,
therefore, geographical representation should be as near equal as possible.
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Therefore, it appears that the students' attachment to the local community
is sufficiently proximate to satisfy the state interest that voters be "knowl-
edgeable." Moreover, Wilkins invalidated, as arbitrary, residency statutes
which failed to place similar burdens on other groups of citizens who were
concededly more transient than students. 1 2
The second claim the state will propose to justify the exclusion of
the student under the "knowledgeable voter" criterion is that the state
has a compelling interest in assuring that the student has a common interest
in all matters pertaining to the local government." 3 In Dunn, the Court
recognized that the State "may require a period of residence sufficiently
lengthy to impress upon its voters the local viewpoint."" 4 However, in
the student context, the state motive is not to impress the local viewpoint
but rather to prevent a student takeover in communities with large student
populations." 5 This fear stems from the supposition that these students
will have views different from those of the local residents. Nevertheless,
even if this belief is valid, it is clear, in light of Carrington v. Rash," 6 that
a difference of opinion cannot serve as a legitimate basis for excluding any
group from the franchise. In Carrington, Texas law precluded "new
residents" from voting until their interests were the same as the "local
residents." The Court stated:
"Fencing out" from the franchise a sector of the population because
of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible. "[Tihe
exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institu-
tions" . . . cannot constitutionally be obliterated because of a fear of
the political views of a particular group of bona fide residents." 7
Thus, the "common interest" goal will not qualify as a "compelling interest"
sufficient to sustain an abridgement of student voting rights.
Finally, the state will argue that the student, being less aware of local
issues, is not likely to exercise his vote "intelligently.""18 In regard to
this argument two points should be noted. First, the federal policy of the
1970 Voting Rights Act, section 201,"1 is to allow people to vote even
if they are not well informed on the issues.120 Arguably, this policy for
112. 385 Mich. at 690, 189 N.W.2d at 432.
113. Cf. text accompanying note 71 supra.
114. 405 U.S. at 354-55.
115. Id. at 354-55 n.28.
116. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
117. Id. at 94 (emphasis added), quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161(1939). In this regard, the Dunn Court stated that "Tennessee's hopes for voters with
a 'common interest in all matters pertaining to [the community's] government' is
impermissible." 405 U.S. at 355 (emphasis added). In Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S.
419 (1970), the Court stated that "all too often, lack of a [common interest] might
mean no more than a different interest." Id. at 423. Also, in Ciprano v. Houma, 395
U.S. 701 (1969), the Court reasoned that "differences of opinion cannot justify
excluding either group from the bond election, when .. . both are substantially
affected .... ." Id. at 705.
118. Cf. 405 U.S. at 356-60.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1(a)(4) (1970).
120. 405 U.S. at 357 n.29. Accord, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S.
621, 631 (1969), in which the Court held that the equal protection clause prohibited
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presidential elections should be applicable to other elections. Secondly,
the Dunn Court rejected a similar argument in support of the durational
residency statute, stating:
[T]he durational residence requirements in this case founder because
of their crudeness as a device for achieving the articulated state goal
of assuring the knowledgeable exercise of the franchise. The classifica-
tions created by durational residence requirements obviously permit
any long-time resident to vote regardless of his knowledge of the
issues - and obviously many long-time residents do not have any.
On the other hand, the classifications bar from the franchise many
other, admittedly new, residents who have become minimally, and
often fully, informed about the issues.1 21
The Court noted that Tennessee had never attempted to further "in-
telligent" voting, although it had had the opportunity, under the absentee
ballot provisions, to impose a standard of knowledge or competence on
the longtime residentsY.2
2
Even if it is assumed that this state interest is legitimate, the state
must establish that students, as a class, are not likely to cast votes in-
telligently. The consensus of opinion, however, does not support this
assumption. As stated during the Senate hearings concerning the adoption
of the twenty-sixth amendment:
Today, all authorities agree that high school graduates are better
educated than ever before in the history of our country. Scores of
tests indicate that the 18 year-olds of today are more concerned and
more aware of national and local issues than their elders. On the
subjects of government, politics, and the functions of the electoral
system time and time again young adults score higher than their
parents. The young men and women reaching maturity in the past
decade have also shown a greater desire to participate in the political
process of the nation than ever before.' 23
Therefore, if one assumes that educational achievement bears some relation-
ship to the voter's ability to comprehend political issues and to become
acquainted with the various candidate's positions, then student residency
requirements create the anomaly of disenfranchising those quite likely to
make an intelligent use of the ballot. As such, the alleged state interest
in "intelligent" voting clearly is constitutionally inadequate to justify the
unequal treatment of student voters.
In the final analysis, it is clear that under the Dunn rationale the states
will have difficulty justifying the special criteria for students set forth in
New York from limiting school district voting to parents of school children and
property owners, rejecting the state argument that other citizens would be less in-
formed on school issues.
121. 405 U.S. at 357-58.
122. Id. at 358-59.
123. Hearings on the Proposed Constitutional Amendments Lowering the Voting
Age to 18 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 295 (1970).
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their voter registration laws. The foregoing discussion demonstrates that
the student poses no greater obstacle to the state in achieving the legiti-
mate state interests underlying residency laws than any other class of
citizens. Therefore, there being no reason in law for the unequal treatment
and the consequent abridgement of voting rights, the laws must be con-
sidered violations of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause.
B. The Lack of Standards in Bona Fide Residency Laws -
Due Process Considerations
As previously noted, the right to vote has been characterized by the
Supreme Court as a "fundamental right."'1 24 Further, laws which inter-
fere with a fundamental right are subject to close judicial scrutiny in
determining compliance with the protections of due process of law.12; A
valid argument can be made that student registration laws violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because they are unduly
vague and give local officials unfettered discretion as to which students
shall be considered a "resident" within the meaning of the state law.
It has recently been noted that:
IT]he standards which students must meet in order to vote in the
locality in which their college is located are extremely vague ....
IT] hus each registration clerk determines himself which factors will
overcome the presumption against student registrability in his city.' 26
[Tihe procedures used in determining student voting residence were
generally chaotic and fraught with the opportunity for discrimination
against students of some particular race, party, or cultural persuasion,
or against students generally.' 27
In Louisiana v. United States,128 parish registrars were given un-
limited discretion in administering interpretation tests to prospective voters.
An applicant was asked to interpret a section of the Louisiana or United
States Constitutions, and the registrar decided whether or not the in-
terpretation was correct. These qualification tests, used to disenfranchise
Blacks, were struck down by the Court for vagueness due to the lack of
precise standards to be used by registrars.129 Although it may be argued
that the reasoning of Louisiana should be construed narrowly to encom-
124. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
125. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
126. Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 677-78, 189 N.W.2d 423, 426 (1971),
citing Note, Restrictions on Student Voting: An Unconstitutional Anachronism?,,
4 J. LAW REFORM 215, 220 (1970).
127. REPORT, supra note 6, at 38-39.
128. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
129. The Court stated:
The cherished right of people in a country like ours to vote cannot be obliterated
by the use of laws like this, which leave the voting fate of a citizen to the passing
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pass only "interpretation tests,"130 the decision seems to be more broadly
based and reflective of a general judicial disapproval of vesting unfettered
discretion in registrars. 131 Following this analysis, it is certain that unless
precise standards are established in student residency laws to guide regis-
trars and to facilitate effective judicial review of their decisions, these
laws will remain devoid of the minimum due process limitations required




Although the states have a compelling interest in requiring that voters
be bona fide residents, it is reasonable to conclude that they have no such
interest in treating students differently from other groups for voter regi-
tration purposes. Since the Supreme Court in Dunn has recently held
durational residency requirements unconstitutional when they extend be-
yond a three-month period,'3 3 the various states will have to make changes
in their current waiting periods for residency. Moreover, the same reason-
ing utilized by the Dunn Court may be adopted in deciding the constitu-
tionality of the present bona fide residency requirement for student voters.
The students' position is highly persuasive when one weighs the grave
loss they sustain against the alleged benefits to the state. When the
student enters a new community with the same intent as his nonstudent
neighbor, they both become members of that community, pay taxes, and
are affected by the local laws and elected officials. Yet, when the oppor-
tunity to participate in the local government arrives, the student must
rebut a presumption against his bona fide residency, whereas his neigh-
bor - who may even be a member of a more transient group - faces
no presumption at all. The inequities of such a situation are compounded
by the lack of precise standards which vests the registrar with unfettered
discretion in determining whether the student's residency is bona fide.
With the young student population now able to exercise the right
to vote, many college communities are afraid of the potential consequences
in their political districts. This threatened loss of power may cause
communities to unite in their attempt to stop the students from voting.
Such an attempt cannot be justified under the Constitution and must be
frustrated by vigorous assertion of the precious rights inalienably granted
thereunder.
Allen M. Silk
130. Cf. id., wherein the Court explicitly stated:
[T]he provisions of the Louisiana Constitution and statutes which require voters
to satisfy registrars of their ability to "understand and give a reasonable inter-
pretation of any section" of the Federal or Louisiana Constitution violate the
Constitution.
131. See id. at 152-53.
132. Cf. id. at 153, wherein the Court considered that the ability to register and
vote should be a function of "clearly defined laws rather than the passing whim or
impulse of an individual registrar."
133. Id. at 348. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
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